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The Enemy Is Justified?

Now if the requirement of D is to question God's sovereignty (or perfection) to undo God's right to destroy at t2 once His work is redeemed, (being all else that would possibly be created after), D, may claim to be the agent of X.

D may claim that the intent of God's creator has been accomplished already and that evil is the intent of God's creator and that God's own sovereignty is besides the point. He may claim that equivalently, or as a logical equivalence, X = D. (they are in agreement) D must claim there is first a parent of God before He may claim the existence of any sibling that has office to disagree with God.

Then, there is a dichotomy. For either D is at fault before his creator (G) or God (G) is at fault before His creator X.

Therefore f(G) v f(D). for a fault f, which represents the fault of the created before the will of the creator.

However X, has no quarrel with G. For God has redeemed His work or is doing so. He is a good creator. If the devils controversy is over his own jealousy for the work God does, to create everything possible except the empty set, then D is claiming the existence of X only as the possible creator whom has reserved the right to Himself to create all, with God only creating by proxy. For by doing so there is opened the lie that D is a sibling.

You may have heard the term "Great Architect". This is the source of that controversy. Likewise there is the damnable belief that Jesus and Lucifer are brothers.

So, if X is perfect then there is required the defeat of evil but if God is the evil to be defeated in the eyes of X, then where is the quarrel with X, when God is a redeeming God? God, without cause is being lambasted for His judgement, or His ability to judge perfectly.

In essence, D is finding fault with the law of God. f(G) is the supposed faulty judgement of God's law as posited by D, and f(D) is the fault of lawlessness of God's law over D. Finding fault with the law is to find fault under the whole law falls on one's self.

Again in essence, blasphemy is then made of the possibility that the law is able to be kept which is blasphemy of the Holy Ghost. Thus, D accuses G that His Spirit is not Holy, whilst G has judged D as guilty of all blasphemy, in attempting to justify His iniquity.

So, we have f(D) v f(G) and we know this is a disjunction because f(D) => ¬f(G) and f(G) => ¬f(D). The law is black and white, "Thou shalt not" etc,

However , it is the substitution D = X that brought us here. In truth, given X, God is a good creator, and X created (all) creators, so has no quarrel with God.

Also, X then if He actually exists must have previously defeated all evil and implies f(G) only for destroying His work beyond the right of proxy, because it is not allowable by "some law of creators" because evil must have been defeated "in the very beginning". Likewise, if creation is taken out of the hands of X, X has possibly lost to "evil". X has not redeemed His work and yet must do so, so D=X finds fault on G. (Yet X performed no act of creation in any work, neither had any purpose to - it not being here.)

so (D=X) => f(G) and (X=G, (there is no quarrel) ) => f(D) also.

Therefore X=D is the principle that implies the disjunction given X, yet a disjunction as above has no excluded middle, thus X=D is the empty or null set, and is therefore a nonsense. (There is no generative principle.)

Now, f on D was possibly the smallest fault under God's law, and f(G) as upon the whole of the law being unjust. Thus, in order for there to be no disjunction we necessarily require that X would hold true no fault on G. Therefore, X and G have the exact same laws (of virtue) and there is in all respects, no argument by infinite descent to justify the least of ones faults before one's creator. Of course there are justifications, but not different laws of virtue (as changing) found in Jesus Christ.

Can it be said the X=G is the disjunction? No, it can not, for D does not create, and perpetually complains of laws of virtue, which exclude no positive properties: With X=G null we have no law in f, and therefore there would never be a quarrel with D, yet X indeed has such a quarrel, as X=G. The contradiction may only imply f(D) once more in the quarrel, as X=G is yet assumed to be perfect.


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