None:
Polyps:
Strongs:

Positively Correct - We Know What We Worship

The modus ponens of P(cogx(¬x)) => P(cogx(G)) may lead to P(cogU(¬x)) => P(cogU(G)) So then we have to be certain that there is only "one way" to God. I.e. one that is logically correct and consistent.

For if P(cogU(¬x)) => P(cogU(G)) leads to P(cogG(¬x)) => P(cogG(G)) => N(G) with the result that ¬P(cogG(¬x)) We have to be assured that U reasons only one possible God "G".

Assuming we have two completely different Gods G and H, we may require that N(G) and N(H) as above.

But if the result is that they are not "equivalent" we would have N(G) v N(H) or N(G) v N(G)

Which by Hartshornes argument results in N(H)=>N(¬G) i.e. G must necessarily be non-existent.

Then it would be true that ;
N(H)=>¬N(G) => ¬P(cogG(¬x)) equivalently entails ¬P(cogU(¬x)) which is a contradiction. (U includes 'x')

N(H) & N(¬G) would result in U becoming unable to reason to 'x' that G is consistent. By symmetry also if N(G) then H is by U inconsistent. We argue then that there is likewise no set of consistent positive properties for H either. (Much like the argument from separation of variables).

So any two Gods G & H must be in perfect agreement - every positive statement that can be consistently assigned to H must also therefore be found in G and vice-versa. (We assumed that perfection was possible, from which we found our contradiction.)

So in some sense we have G=H or G as a set of consistent positive properties is a proper subset of those in H (or vice versa).

Then if every God is in perfect agreement, in essence we merely divide God as one God into many possible sets of positive properties reasoned mutually consistent to us by U.

Therefore we have N(G) => cogG(G) => cogU(G) => cogx(G) => L(G).

Where does L(G) come from? It should be our first assumption! L(G) differentiates every G from H from J etc.... We leave those positive properties reasoned universal by U (virtues) separate in God from those distinguishing features that God has laid upon us in His laws to separate out those "human" virtues which He finds pleasing for us to keep intact. The law then is for men, whereas the Holy Spirit U is to lead us towards obedience and indicate the fulfilment of the law in Christ.

Commandments are to separate out for God a people to save: We should be able to justify that a different law indicates a different God. We should be able to see this from the perspective of God by "U" remaining itself consistent. (G must be "H enough").

There must be one God by "N(H) v N(H) & N(G)" above, (unless H is "G enough"). If the commandments are there to preserve human virtues with a distinguishable set of commandments of "right and wrong" for human behaviour, we immediately entail that those virtues within which we see the fulfillment of the law by Christ are those uniquely pleasing to God, and we find the uniqueness of God in the person and life of Jesus Christ Himself.

So to leave to God His liberty L(G) - the right to choose any set of virtues to be fulfilled by Christ (as sent to a people separated out by His law): we now know that H is indeed "G enough" and the uniqueness of God's consistency reasoned by U through the prophets to indicate the coming of the true Christ and the putting aside of all false doctrine is sufficient to show that the one God is able to be consistently identified by the law, the prophets and the coming of Christ.

So ¬L(G) => ¬P(cogx(G)) => ¬P(cogU(G)) => > ¬P(cogG(G)) => N(¬G) i.e. God can not exist.

All we need to justify is ¬L(G) => ¬P(cogx(G)).

If God is not at liberty to choose His nature and sovereignty over us, then we must infer it is not possible to distinguish one God from another: it likewise becomes implausible for G~x => x~G. (and not x~H, as from the definition of "being"). ¬L(G) is then the impossibility for God to separate out those whom believe in Him from those that believe in some other 'H' or 'J'.

But then if N(G) v N(H), (i.e. N(G) v N(¬G) )"H" may be completely inconsistent, like to a "flying spaghetti monster". But if there may be no distinction of L(G) to separate God from the spaghetti monster, without L(G) we have every God a "spaghetti monster."

Thus there are no consistent gods and we have ¬P(cogx(G)).

So from our universal being we reason L(G) - that God is able to call to Himself a people under His own choice of laws.


So if we have one God 'G', we may now state that G~x is universally true for all x, but if "x~G" consistently as would U~G then it is positive for "G~x" and therefore since G is then positively correct in identification, we infer from pos(G~x) => pos(x~G) in kind.

Therefore if 'x' holds true L(G) then pos(x~G) and pos(G~x) are both positive statements. We say L(G) => pos(G~x) for all x with Hx(G) containing L(G).


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