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The Confusion Of Self Difference

Now, the empty and self-difference for any set S, a subset of a set T is stated as S=T \ S. (S is co-equal to the set difference in some container properly containing the subset S.) Now, to return to the UAA as well as the "proof by retardation", I ask if there is any argument so confusing to every possible being that it would also confuse God and therefore preclude any possibility of itself being understood by a perfect mind of a perfect God.

Now, in order for there to be an argument it needs to be understood - and it must be perfectly understood in some chain of minds in all possible worlds, leading to the statement that the argument is maximally confusing if there is every equivalence found between it and every possible argument that may be made also through a modal collapse.

I proceed to construct a similar argument as Gödel's ontological (modal) proof using such "confusion" as an essence. I will "esteem" the same definition of an essence yet with the empty self difference as that essence and show why there is a modal collapse and also the certain remaining possibility of a perfect mind that may understand the argument of all such arguments: because quite simply, every such argument is understood at some point in the chain of all possible minds (i.e. at somewhere above the bottom) and God may easily "look down" on us all!

So, if the essence may be derived as follows.

1) Every possible UAA is a correct, logical, incontrovertible and greater argument than any one that is not:

The UAA should not, then, be unique, but every such argument must also have the same logical form.

2) Every possible mind except for perfect God is retarded, and man is far more so than any possibly perfect mind that may understand any such UAA.

There should be no overlap in the chain of all possible minds between any perfect "God-like" minds that understand the form of any UAA and all those lesser minds that are retarded.

3) Every argument is positive if it is a UAA and negative if it is not (I define a non-principal ultrafilter) I now make every such ultrafilter principal by adding the single axiom:

4) "Every UAA in the chain is confusing to every possible mind lower in the chain than the minimally great/perfect one understanding it."

I may example this by simply attaching a single axiom

A1) "The God will say this UAA (argument) is always false because it is true."

Does this suffice to confuse even the most perfect mind?

I must entail a confusion of each perfect mind over those "lesser minds" below them in the chain. Then, as each "perfect" mind will understand the form of the UAA (and also, necessarily A1, but are unable to communicate either of those arguments rationally to those lower in the chain, to convey that same understanding, I may state those perfect minds are equivalently "confused".)

Then each perfect mind must be confused by some "least UAA" understood only by those higher in the chain, and that the "confusion" itself is an equivalence between those that cannot understand and those that cannot inform or persuade of the argument effectively.

I should modify the statement in each case to one along the lines of "No lesser being may understand such a UAA even when reasoned perfectly by any perfect being that understands it." I may also state that in every case, there is no perfect being that may add a reason why they understand the UAA to the UAA itself, as the UAA itself is not understood by any imperfect (or lesser) mind.

So, can God communicate any explanation of the same logical form repeated to the whole chain and vindicate Himself if we apply Zorn's lemma and simply choose Him to be confused at the top of the chain of all minds?

By this construction, my goal is to work toward the empty self difference applied to all possible minds except for a maximally perfect mind, which cannot communicate the same logical form to any being that also understands the same form but is found somewhere lower in the chain.

Is there, then, only one such perfect being at the very top of the chain? By definition, then, if there is such a UAA (which there is by axiom) it cannot be communicated from God to us, and there is no authority to be found in any such perfect mind or God Himself to judge man for his lack of faith without a universal being that may reason it perfectly for communication. (Which is as the Holy Spirit, or Christ's as that of prophecy).

But is it perfect to reason out such a UAA when God certainly exists to believe in instead? I doubt it!

i) So, any UAA is positive if it is not communicable to those lower in the chain, and not positive otherwise.

ii) Every UAA is of the same logical form, so if one form is found positive and entails another form is also non-communicable, then both are positive, (We ascend the chain above any given possible being by Zorn's lemma.)

iii) I note the UAA is possibly confusing to the whole chain and that only God(s) may possibly understand it. (cf. Gödel's first theorem).

iv) The master-UAA at the top of the chain is the only "true" UAA. (It is equivalent to Gödel's "Godlikeness" and in modal collapse becomes a principal element within the whole chain and therefore no such UAA argument may be understood by any mind in the chain except only, possibly, for God Almighty Himself so confused in equivalence.

v) Such a UAA is positive to God, as it therefore reveals Him or any otherwise (possibly covert) outrageous liar.

vi) God Himself, is possibly confused (cf., Gödel's second theorem.)

vii) The "essence of" the UAA is that there is one logical form of UAA confusing the whole chain, (including any "God-like" being as per (v).) (cf. Gödel's essence).

viii) The confused God is God only if He is maximally confused and at the top of the chain, and is maximally separated from all retards. I.e. God, must necessarily be confused by the UAA modified by (A1) above, else He is not at the top of the chain.

ix) The one form of the UAA is found confusion itself. (Modal collapse in empty worlds), and only God is confused; how? God may only exist if He is also so confused. (cf. Gödel's definition 3, essence entails existence) Either that, or the UAA precludes God's own existence anyway.

I.e. if God cannot communicate it (the UAA, as by this definition) then He Himself is confused!

x) Is it positive to reveal God exists by proving He may not exist or cannot also prove it Himself? If necessary existence is a positive predicate, then yes it is possibly positive!

xi) There is, then, a necessarily confused God with a perfect mind, which itself is a contradiction, the whole chain is confused.

That stated, God, whilst having all understanding of the UAA argument, may not confide its explanation to anyone else in the chain below Him.

Man, at the "near very bottom" of the chain has no such understanding and lacks every positive property of the UAA, as He cannot understand it nor ever can or will.

The chain is then empty of confusion at the bottom (with nothing else to confuse there is but the empty self-difference) and completely confused at the top: yet there is also a modal collapse and every UAA is equivalent in one form.

So, there necessarily exists such a UAA, and God cannot communicate it to any other than Himself, other than to state it is true by A1, therefore confusing the whole chain!

So, where is the empty self difference? It is a modal collapse that there is never any confusion at all; God may communicate not by simply calling the UAA a "lie" but by reasoning that it (as an empty self difference) and the equivalent confusion does not exist as an essence because it is empty of all confusion to every (necessarily) non-confused member of the chain, and every part of the chain is therefore truly resolved and it is also found that God may exist (He is no liar) and may necessarily exist as by any ontological argument for His existence.

In case you were wondering why this was not put in the previous section on "proofs for God's existence", all of these arguments are equivalents of those same arguments for God's existence and there is the easy counter-argument that the final result, surprisingly proves God's existence. But, wait! Isn't that also a qualifier for God's existence overall as well? There should be no confusion, then, only if there is no UAA at all and it is assumed God does not exist. For then, God could possibly exist and the UAA has an equivalent in Gödel or Anselm etc, and God is no liar! That is, unless every ontological argument is nonsense and all such proofs in every form above fail altogether. (Is such necessary existence a predicate? I argue in the previous section that it certainly is.)

Ok! I expect an answer from God over this one! These I quickly gleaned, but I will continue to wait on this for a while.

Mat 16:8 Which when Jesus perceived, he said unto them, O ye of little faith, why reason ye among yourselves, because ye have brought no bread? (KJV)

Heb 11:6 But without faith it is impossible to please him: for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him. (KJV)


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