Existence Is Not A Predicate

The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word "predicate" as;

noun (2) logic something which is affirmed or denied concerning an argument of a proposition.
verb (1) Grammar & logic state, affirm, or assert (something) about the subject of a sentence or an argument of a proposition: a word which predicates something about its subject | aggression is predicated of those who act aggressively.
declare or affirm (something) as true or existing: postulate or assert.
(2) (predicate something on/upon) found or base something on: the theory of structure on which later chemistry was predicated.

This argument is not an ontological one, but that the ontological argument is logically unsafe. The objection is; that a fallacy of equivocation between "existence" as a property of a subject (i.e. God) and it's (His) existence in reality is being made. The objection is that all existential statements are actually statements of ordinals.(that is, positive whole numbers.)

Then existence is merely a matter of the number of instances of an object rather than the property of existence attached to the objects other properties. (weight, mass, momentum etc). Therefore even if we assume that existence of a being is to be taken as "zero or greater instances" and a necessary being as having the statement, "there is at least one instance of the being". We can no longer apply the modal or ontological arguments in the previous section.

This can be seen in the assumption. "God is greater if he exists in reality as opposed to only in your understanding." This statement immediate assumes that "exists in reality" is a property of God; a predicate. Therefore if the statement is "God is greater if he has more instances than zero" in the ordinal sense would make an infinite number of Gods! God's existence if grounded with this statement proven logically correct would entail that twice that number is twice as great! so God is therefore an infinte cascade. (There is no sense of uniqueness in one or two instances as opposed to zero if one instance is greater than zero.)

More non-existent Gods do not make non-existent God greater, however.

How may we argue against this? We may immediately restrict our arguments to beings to which we may "legally" predicate existence. We would infer that "conceiving of a being" would imply that the "be" in "being" is enough to predicate existence. I know for a fact that there are billions of people on earth, but the only understanding I have of their 'being' is that they think as any other may do so.

So, whereas we would imply that "beings" exist, I would restrict beings to become members of the class of subjects that may symmetrically conceive of their mode of existence "in each other:"

Thus if "x conceives a possible being y in his imagination" then it immediately follows that "conceive" is understood as: "the possible being 'y' as conceived by 'x' may be imagined by x to possibly conceive of x in like terms as x to himself."

Then we immediately upon our "conceiving of being" have an equivalence relation '~'.

x~x (reflexivity)
x~y <=> y~x (symmetry)
x~y , y~z => x~z (transitivity)

We then acknowledge that if a necessary being may not conceive of His own non-existence, he may conceive of any type of being x that may in turn conceive of the necessary existence of God. So this relation '~' would allow Anselm's principle G=>N(G).

Note that symmetry holds by definition, and transitivity also since x could imagine a being that could conceive of z as much as himself x in return.

Also, by conceiving the necessary existence of God, we would infer that G~x for all x if G is perfect since P(x~G) for all x. This follows from P(x~G) and symmetry.

This equivalence relation to all intents and purposes is strong and yet flexible enough to allow that P(x exists) be predicated with "being" if we rephrase to P(y~x) given some being 'y'. This may seem circular, but we are not interested in anything but 'existence' when it comes to "beings". Predicating a coffee cup with the wider term of 'existence' becomes nonsense accordingly and merely a matter of ordinals as per the objection above.

We should note that on the left of x~y, x is a concrete individual whereas y on the right is an abstraction. Since we will be examining God, (a being with necessary existence - and whom is more often on the right) we will assume that proper belief in God may be consistent, and leave the decision on the result to the believer.

Of course if you may defend the consistency of the statement that "God, being omnipotent - may create His own mind from merely predicating Himself with being accordingly", then truly, a being greater than that in your understanding exists, and your faith is entirely defensible and it is your own choice.

What we should argue then is that '~' is not an operator, but fulfills the same conditions as would existence as a predicate. I can be as sure of God's existence metaphysically as I can be of someone who has left my line of sight or has left the room I am in. Or of whom I can no longer hear. God is as real to me as the friend I meet for coffee: I would be insane to consider them merely a "simulation" or unreal: Likewise "In God I live, move and have my being." That I am created by Him for the purpose that G~x himself is enough for me.

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