Is God Corrupt? His Ways Are Equal.

What of the statement that if God is to blame for letting evil happen, he is corrupt and if he is not to blame then he is incompetent; We will call this statement "X".

If we assume that there is some fault 'f' that may apply to God alone N(f(G)) we would formulate that since f does not apply to another the following rephrasing of the above holds.

P(f(G) & ¬P(f(x) for any x not G)) v (N(¬f(x)) for all x & G)

I.e. either God exists and is solely at fault (left hand side)
or: For God to exist it must be equivalently true that it is impossible for any x to be at fault with an 'f'. (right hand side)

If this is not the statement X, then I invite you to rephrase. However we reduce from the set of all 'x' to only those sets of 'l' chosen for forgiveness by God.

P(f(G) & ¬P(f(l) for any l not G)) v (N(¬f(l)) for all l & G)

But the nature of redemption on such an 'l' includes that the redeemer G is an 'l' also, (God may also choose Himself) so the left hand side appears incorrect: but the left hand side is;

¬P(f(x) applies to anyone except G & "God exists") i.e. N¬(f(x) applies to anyone except G & "G exists") or it is the case that in our "or" statement

N(f(G)) => N¬(f(l) & "G exists") v (f(l)&¬f(l) & G)

And N¬(f(l) & "G exists") would assert that "G exists" implies ¬f(l) (not that 'l' is redeemed, but that 'f' is inconsistent on 'l' given G exists) or f(l) => ¬G, an unforgiven (an inconsistent) 'l' implies God is not existent.

but f(l)&¬f(l) is consistent with G so N(f(G)) v "G saves". Also N(f(G)&¬f(l)) v N(l is in the set of all l & G), i.e. G is also an 'l'.

i.e. either G (exists and is at fault) or f is inconsistent : but if f is inconsistent with all "l" then surely it is inconsistent with God himself?

Both sides resolve to whether 'f' is actually a fault. There is no fault that prevents the salvation of God, If God is also such an "l" then clearly the right hand side is correct, and God is enforcing the lack of fault in his own people and will not permit evil to continue in them. (I.e. they are redeemable) Which is what was wanted.

But what of the negation of the left hand side? N(f(G)&¬f(l)) would imply N¬N(f(G)&¬f(l)) => N¬(f(G)&¬f(l)) : or f(G)=>f(l)

Ie.. if it is not necessary for God to be at fault he will not be from His perfection: So, f(G) => f(l) universally. Yet f is inconsistent then on any 'l' by God's salvation: therefore f must be inconsistent for God.

Likewise we may form the statement with g = ¬f where to withhold g from the set of all x is a fault. (God doesn't show enough Good)

P(G & ¬P(¬g(x) for all x not G)) v (N(g(x)) for all x & G)

P(G &N(g(x) for all x not G)) v (N(g(x)) for all x & G)

But if on the left hand we see that it is impossible for God to show "good" to himself then God is inconsistent, showing Himself to be at fault toward Himself, being at fault. So we would assume that now the right hand side is consistent that God requires His saved 'l' not to withhold good from each other.

The right hand side is vacuously the case that g(x) is not a fault, and is necessarily redeemable, ie with a t2=t1. Yet this is only "necessarily" redeemable if x is an l. Thus our substitution actually renders P(g(x)) & ¬P(g(x)), that "good" is also inconsistent

The left hand side, that N(g(G)) is actually affirmed by God's perfection and not N(¬g(G)) as from the substitution.

Thus N¬(¬g(G) & g(l)) is the statement that g(l)=>g(G) i.e. G is an l. Therefore the right hand side of inconsistency of good is flawed: and we can state:

"God's ways are equal", His chosen are not permitted to further that which he defines as evil, and He will lack no good towards them that He will call good Himself.

Of course in both terms it is a requirement that God decide for the saved what constitues good and evil by nature of His perfection. We can now state that God is at supreme liberty to dictate these condiditons, and that it is the case for l to preserve the liberty of God in doing good or doing evil to any member of 'l' or 'x'.

For if we conceive of a "g" that is a perfection 'p' we could expect of God, then we could write

f(G) v G&p
But in the set l,
f(G)&¬f(G) v (l&p)
"G saves" v (l&p)
G v l&p
G=>N(G) => N¬(l&p)

So likewise we must be aware that God is at liberty in completeness to do evil or to do good. However He will not switch evil for good and good for evil. (as if g=f rather than g=¬f)

So even if "good" may be expected of God, the believer 'l' must concede to the will of God in obedience to logic. If evil is expected then God can be motivated toward good, for the ultrafilter ensures it. I.e.we may also place;

g(G) v G&¬p
But in the set l, G is perfect, t2=t1
g(G)&¬g(G) v (l&¬p)
(N(g(G)) is positive and not N(¬g(G)) i.e. f(G) is untrue)
"g(G) saves" v (l&¬p)
g(G) v l&¬p
g(G)=>G=>N(G) => N¬(l&¬p)

OF course, it is up to God to decide what and how ¬p is an "evil" for the individual 'l'. God is still at complete liberty in action .

Continue To Next Page

Return To Section Start

Return To Previous Page